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Preface

This book is based upon my experience as an environmental advocate
and observer of the environmental scene over the past thirty-five
years. The tales it tells took place in the United States, but the practices it attacks-legislators hiding behind bureaucracies and needlessly centralizing power-are of concern in Europe and beyond.
In the United States, Congress passed statutes shaped so that the
legislators could claim to have guaranteed a clean earth, yet still
escape blame for the subsequent disappointments and costs. The
statutes ordered the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
solve every pollution problem, no matter how local, yet left it with
the hard choices on how to do so. Every time the public's desire for a
clean earth ran up against its other desires, the agency found itself in
the middle. Such conflicts came with dizzying rapidity because every
environmental problem was on this national agency's agenda. The
United States is much cleaner today than it was thirty-five years ago,
but the reason was the public's deeply felt desire for environmental
quality rather than Congress's handing off the ball to the EPA.
Congress has been "political" in the worst sense of the word.
Regulation is inevitably political because, no matter who makes the
rules, they reflect tugging and hauling between conflicting interests
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in society. The system that Congress has established for making
environmental regulation is political in a different and invidious
sense: the legislators shaped it to make themselves look good rather
than to serve the interests of their constituents.
I hope this book attracts general readers. For them, it is meant to
stand on its own. Those with a special interest in regulatory politics
or law should regard it as part of a trilogy on the problem of legislators shirking responsibility and needlessly centralizing power by
establishing ersatz rights. The other volumes are Power without Re-

sponsibility: How Congress Abuses the People through Delegation (Yale
University Press, 1993) and, with Ross Sandler, Democracy by Decree:

What Happens When Courts Run Government (Yale University Press,
2003). While the earlier volumes dealt with this problem in all areas
of regulation, the present volume deals with it exclusively in the
environmental area. Because the present volume tells how my career
in environmental advocacy opened my eyes to the problem, it is,
although written last, the one to read first.

CH APTER ONE

Introduction

Then and Now

"Then" began late in 1975 at a dusty little airfield near San Juan,
Puerto Rico. My traveling companion and I got into a one-engine
plane and were flown west beyond the end of land and out over the
Caribbean. We spotted our destination on the watery horizon, at
first only the silhouette of a distant mesa and then a huge white rock.
Its cliffs plunged two hundred feet to a narrow fringe of palms
surrounded by sand, clear waters, and reefs. We flew the seven-mile
length of the island, banked sharply around the far tip, plunged
down the cliff, and stopped with a jerk on a tiny strip of grass hidden
in the palms. This was Isla de Mona.
The pilot kept the engine running as he quickly passed us the
food and water. We had to bring our own because no one lived here.
There were only a few campers-a Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
forest ranger near the strip and a family somewhere far down the
beach. The pilot said goodbye and took off, leaving us in stillness
and silence. We searched out a campsite and met our neighbors, the
Mona Iguanas. Tinted red and purple with spiky backs, they look
like dragons but are only four feet long and eat plants, not maidens.
I had come to Mona for a reason. Lawyers from the Puerto Rico
bar association had asked me-a lawyer at the Natural Resources
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1. A Mona Iguana. Courtesy of Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Department of

Natural and Environmental Resources.

Defense Council, a private environmental advocacy group-to bring
a lawsuit to stop the island from being turned into a massive petroleum complex. Major oil companies would bring crude oil from
Iran, Iraq, and other Persian Gulf countries to Mona in supertankers
and refine it there. The gasoline and products would then be transshipped in regular tankers to established ports in the eastern United
States. This home of the Mona Iguana and more than a hundred
other endangered and unique species, rightly known as the Galapagos of the Caribbean, would become a smelly eyesore.
Mona was surely not the most appropriate site on the eastern
seaboard for such a project, but newly strengthened environmental
laws had made it all but impossible to build a supertanker port or
refinery in anyone's backyard. Mona's attraction was that it was no
one's backyard. Yet, to our Puerto Rican clients, Mona was their
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Grand Canyon, and the "Superpuerto," as it was called in the Puerto
Rican press, epitomized colonialism in modern guise.
American environmental laws apply in Puerto Rico. The hope of
the Superpuerto's sponsors was that no one in Puerto Rico could put
together sufficient legal resources to mount a serious challenge, at
least until after the project was too far along to stop. They made it an
elusive target by keeping the particulars of their plans secret. But our
team of Puerto Rican and mainland attorneys was able to piece
together enough facts to file a detailed complaint. We moved the
district court judge to act, but he never responded. When we called
his strange silence to the attention of the Court of Appeals in Boston,
a new judge was assigned and he made it clear that he would decide.
At this point the sponsors of the Superpuerto announced that it
would be abandoned, but not, they said, because of our lawsuit.
Now I had come to Mona to savor what we had worked to save.
We dove among the pristine coral reefs and, from under the clump
of palms that was our home, watched brilliant suns and soft moons.
One day I hiked to the top of the mesa and, looking out over the
expanse of land and sea, I thought of my work as bringing together
justice and beauty. In short, I felt altogether satisfied with myself-a
sure sign of danger.
The next evening, the weather changed. Off the spit of land on
which we camped, tall banks of dark clouds collided and billowed
higher. The sea rose and the waves boiled. Just then, newly hatched
turtles popped out of the beach and raced toward the water. Their

timing felt perfect, was perfect, but I knew nothing of their natural
clocks and was utterly surprised. The baby turtles struggled to surmount the ruffles in the sand and wobbled toward crashing waves.
No sooner had the first few won my heart and been swept out to sea,
than gulls and hawks spotted the moving feast and swarmed to eat
their fill. Like a youngster watching Bambi, I was appalled. I tried to
chase the predators away, but the task was hopeless. I could taxi this
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or that little turtle to the sea, but they hated being picked up and
were now emerging by the thousands and most were being eaten. I
stopped, took a breath, and realized that the birds and turtles had
been at this for ages. Just who did I think I was to interfere? I went
back to the camp and made a fire, and it grew dark.
The next morning, it was still dark and even more foreboding,
the wind fierce and cold. The forest ranger came by to tell of a radio
message warning of worse to come. We had been ordered to evacuate on boats that would be sent to get us at dawn the following day.
That night, the tiny populace of the island camped together. It
turned out the family down the beach was that of the former oil
company executive who had been in charge of the Superpuerto
project. Our previous opponent now had a face, and he seemed
decent enough. If he knew we had been opponents, he did not say,
nor did I. This was no time for a confrontation.
At the dark dawn, he and his family boarded the spiffy yacht on
which they had come. The forest ranger got on a modern police
launch sent out to fetch him, but not before putting us on an old
trawler that had been fishing off Mona. The yacht and the police
launch, with their sleek hulls and powerful motors, seemed like safer
bets in a storm, but they would not take us. I remembered from
researching the case that the Mona Passage was notoriously dangerous in a storm.
The winds were too fierce for the fishermen to hoist their sails.
An auxiliary engine barely pushed us through the towering waves.
For me, the choice was to go below deck, where the diesel fumes
made me sick to my stomach, or to stay above deck, where the spray
chilled me to the bone. Above I could at least see the threat. I wanted
to ask the crew, "Will we make it?" but they seemed far too busy
pumping water out of the creaking wooden hull. I could tell from
the looks on their faces that we probably would if the engine did not
quit.
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As the trawler chugged along, I reflected that these fishermen
had had more at stake in the Superpuerto fight than anyone. Oil
spills might have ruined their fishing; oil refineries might have employed their children. But no one had ever asked them whether they
wanted the project or our opposition to it. They had been treated
like children, but now I was huddled on the deck at their feet,
helpless as a babe, my life in their capable hands. I had fallen a long
way from the heights of the Mona mesa. Sick to my stomach, I asked
myself-I really did- "Isn't there some way that ordinary people
such as these fishermen could have a meaningful say on environmental decisions so vital to them?" I was not enough of a romantic
to believe that such matters could be decided in New England-style
town meetings and too much of a skeptic to believe that sessions in
which government and corporate bureaucrats hear out the locals
would be more than charades.
When we landed in the little port of Mayaguez that afternoon,
the piers were lined with anxious faces. Upon stepping ashore, we
learned that the police launch, whose passengers I had envied, had
hit a reef and had gone down with all aboard. A kind family took us
to their home, gave us hot soup, and put us to bed. I was asleep
before the winter sun had set.
I awoke the next morning not quite believing how near death we
had come. I made my way back to New York, putting out of my
mind for the moment the question posed by the Mona Passage: How
could environment policy be made less elitist and more accountable
to ordinary people? I believed, as I had all along, that the appointed
administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sitting
in Washington should have the power to make the environmental
rules for the entire country.
That was then.
"Now" is the writing of this book. It began almost a quarter
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2. Dan Wilson and Susan Knapp at their wedding rehearsal in

front of their cider barn, 1998.

deal with local conditions, what they fear will slip through their
fingers is not only their livelihood, but also the enjoyment that they
get from farming. A few nights before the wedding, sitting at our
kitchen table, Dan said, "I can imagine the day when my closest
relation to growing apples will be buying them in the supermarket."
Susan nodded. What a tragedy that would be. They express their
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artistry and friendship through the orchard and the many activities
that take place around it. They are a focus of our rural society. Their
quitting farming would leave a hole bigger than a barn.
Dan and Susan's fears are widely shared. The day after their
wedding, I fly down to Washington to address the state presidents of
the American Farm Bureau Federation. They had supported the
Food Quality Protection Act. They know that the wrong pesticides,
or the right pesticides wrongly applied, can be harmful. They had
been told by their representatives in Congress that the EPA would
base its regulation of farmers on long-standing and commonsensical
scientific practices. But, now that it has the power, the EPA, they tell
me, is changing its mind about how the act will work, and the result
will be that many widely used chemicals will be eliminated. These
farm leaders represent a powerful constituency, yet they feel powerless to protect themselves from what they consider a regulatory
juggernaut.
The farm leaders wonder, as I had in the Mona Passage, whether
environment policy could be made less elitist and more accountable
to ordinary people. Now I have an answer. It is twofold.
First, states and localities rather than the federal government
should make the rules controlling almost all pollution sources. The
federal government should step in only when states, left to their own
devices, are likely to allow significant harm to be done beyond their
own borders. The result would be that federal government would
make the rules for only a small fraction of sources, generally the
largest ones. Today, in contrast, the EPA controls the regulation of
millions of farms, businesses, and government activities, regardless
of how localized their impact may be. This is why the EPA, whether
measured by staff, budget, or impact, now runs the nation's largest
regulatory regime. 3
Second, at every level of government, elected legislators should
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make the pollution control rules. Today, in contrast, appointed
functionaries at the EPA and its state counterparts acting under its
supervision make most of the rules.
My answer is, of course, not the least bit new. Our Constitution
sought to guarantee a republic in which government would be as
close to home as possible and there would be no taxation without
representation or, for that matter, regulation without representation.
In that republic, new rules could come only in statutes on which our
elected representatives would vote. That, for our representatives, is
the rub. They would be stuck with direct, personal responsibility for
the costs as well as the benefits of the rules. Better for the legislators is
a system in which they pass statutes ordering the EPA to make the
rules necessary to clean the earth. In that way, the legislators can say
they passed a "law" to clean the earth while shifting to the EPA the
blame for the costs of making it so. The EPA often lacks the political
muscle needed to deliver the rules that would achieve the environmental goals in the statutes, but that presents no political problem for
the legislators. They can blame the EPA for the failure.
This arrangement lets members of Congress profit from the environment issue on the cheap and so gives them a personal stake in
expanding the federal environmental regulation franchise to include
issues plainly within the competence of state and local government.
Congress will let go of local environmental problems only if its
members take responsibility for the environmental laws, and they
can take responsibility only if Congress lets go of local environmental problems.
When I became an environmental advocate, I regarded questions
about the constitutionality of the EPA's power as the last refuge of
polluters, and I litigated accordingly.4 I wanted to uphold the public
interest in the present rather than the constitutional ideals of the
past. Experience has since taught me that those constitutional ideals
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"Rules," "Laws," and "Statutes"
Congress fails to make law when it passes a statute that tells the
EPA to make the rules regulating pollution. The word for a rule
regulating private conduct is "law." In Britain to this day, law means
rules of conduct, whether based on statute, custom, or morality, and
does not mean a statute that fails to contain the rules. In the United
States, we sometimes say that a statute handing off lawmaking authority to an agency is a law, but that depreciates the word and lets our
elected "lawmakers" take credit for shouldering responsibility that
they in fact have shirked.5 I will use "law" to mean rules, whether
made by Congress or the EPA, but not statutes telling the EPA to make
rules.

are the safest road to the public interest, including the public's
deeply felt interest in a clean earth.
Because it was experience that opened my eyes, this book starts
with the experiences that persuaded me to change my mind about
what Congress has done. These stories, and the essays intertwined
with them, lead the reader along the following path.
Part I of the book traces the EPA's rise to power and what became

of that power. Rachel Carson published Silent Spring in 1962. It
broadened public concern about the environment. The next year
Congress passed a largely symbolic statute called the Clean Air Act,
which called for states and localities to regulate pollution. From 1963

to 1968, the number of states with air pollution laws went from
sixteen to forty-six.6 The burdens imposed varied greatly and were
small by modern standards, but they were enough to prompt the
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auto industry and then the coal mining industry to try to check the
state and local response to grassroots demands. The solution they hit
upon was to get Congress to amend the Clean Air Act to put a
national agency in charge of making air pollution laws. Congress
complied in the mid-1960s. The agency, a part of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, made it harder for states and localities to respond to the growing environmental concern.
The grassroots movement not only survived but grew beyond all
expectations. On the first Earth Day, held on April 22, 1970, twenty
million Americans gathered at demonstrations in forty-two states
"to challenge the corporate and government leaders who promise
change" but do not deliver. Congress shut down so that the legislators could go home to show their solidarity, but it had to do something substantial. While members deliberated, President Richard
Nixon established the EPA.? By the end of the year, the 1970 Clean
Air Act endowed it with sweeping new powers to make law. It was
the prototype for many subsequent statutes dealing with other kinds
of pollution.
With the new Clean Air Act, the EPA, politicians said, was to be
different from and better than government as usual. Power would be
shifted from state and local governments to the national government
and from legislators elected by voters to functionaries bound to do
what science demands. No longer would the environment be vulnerable to governors, mayors, and legislators swayed by greedy corporations and voters who did not care enough about the environment.8
Instead, a scientific elite insulated from politics would rule. Most industries went along, seemingly out of a belief that the new EPA would
not accomplish much. They were correct, at least in the beginning.

Through the 1970s, the air pollution laws that the EPA made
accomplished less than the laws that came directly from Congress,
states, and localities. Today the air is much cleaner than it was in
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1970, and the EPA deserves some of the credit, but it is simply wrong
to think that the EPA imposed environmental protection on a reluctant public.
Part II examines the EPA's claim to speak for science. The wellintentioned hope that an expert national agency would base its decisions on science has foundered on the reality that the science is
surprisingly uncertain, that zero risk is physically impossible, and
that measures to decrease a risk have costs and sometimes actually
increase other risks. There are still other considerations that science
cannot possibly take into account, such as the trustworthiness of
individuals and the desire of people to take pleasure from selfdirected work. Take, for example, the regulation of pesticide use on
farms like that of Dan Wilson and Susan Knapp. They have more at
stake in safe practices in their orchard than does anyone. They and
their children live among its trees and eat the fruit throughout the
year. They are good people who could not sleep if they sold tainted
apples or cider.
There are, of course, people unlike Dan and Susan-powerhungry entrepreneurs and the well-intentioned but heedless. We
need environmental law to guard against such as them. Yet having
these decisions made by the EPA does not necessarily get them resolved in a commonsense, let alone a scientific, way. After all, not all
the people with influence over the EPA's laws-whether in Congress,
environmental groups, trade associations, or the EPA itself-are sensible people. They too have their share of power-hungry entrepreneurs and the well-intentioned but heedless. Lawmaking by the EPA
is inevitably political, but the agency is forced to dress up its politics
as science.
Part III examines the conflict between the EPA and two fundamental principles of our republic-that government should be as
close to home as possible and that laws should be made by elected
legislators. It shows how we can honor these principles without
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impairing government's ability to respond to the voters' desire for a
sound environment. We do not have to be ruled by the EPA for
science to be given its due. Experts would still provide what information science offers, but the final judgments are political and
ought to be made by elected politicians rather than appointed ones.
We also do not have to be ruled by the EPA for environmental
protection to get its due. It has strong support in the electorate and
gets organized expression through thousands of groups at the state
and local level and well-financed national organizations that are
powers in Washington. Their leaders enjoy the same access to many
national political figures as do the heads of the largest corporations
and unions.
Part IV shows that the EPA delays good laws, imposes bad ones,
and is too big, muscle-bound, and remote to consider the facts on
the ground. The problem is not that it delivers too much environmental protection in the aggregate, but that sometimes it does not
deliver enough, and that which it does deliver comes with unnecessary burdens on the public. The burdens on businesses and farmers
are highly visible because they are direct. The burdens on wage
earners, consumers, and taxpayers are all but invisible because they
come circuitously, but they are large and they hurt. Such leaders of
the academic left and center as Bruce Ackerman, Stephen Breyer,
E. Donald Elliott, Richard Stewart, and Cass Sunstein, as well as
those of the right, have argued that the EPA needlessly burdens
society. The burdens sap not only our monthly budgets and retirement savings but also values more precious than dollars-democracy, liberty, justice, and (I will back this up) joy. These downsides
are a drag on environmental protection.
How, if I am right, could all this have been missed by the general
public? The reason is that most people see environmental protection
as a struggle between the EPA and big business. The perception is in
many ways false. Major corporations today understand that the EPA
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provides them with substantial benefits. Its lawmaking is necessarily
slow because of procedural requirements imposed by Congress and
the courts. The EPA also buffers large corporations from competition from small and emerging businesses. The regulations are expensive to large corporations, but most of the cost can be passed on
to consumers. A powerful EPA is good for many big businesses and
all national legislators, but bad for small business and local flexibility-good for national advocacy organizations and industries that
sell pollution-control services, but bad for civic and neighborhood
associations and the rest of us.
Many major corporations want to keep the EPA in charge but
have it make laws that burden them less. Under the banner of his
"Contract with America" released in 1994, House Speaker Newt Gingrich backed a bill that would have required the EPA to balance costs
against human health benefits in making environmental laws. It was
easy for environmental advocates to picture the legislation as a macabre payback for campaign contributions. The bill did nothing to
correct the delays in the EPA's issuing of laws needed to protect
public health, but instead would have made them worse by requiring
it to prove in advance that the law's benefits would exceed its costs.
Such proof is often unavailable, even for laws that make perfectly
good sense. The bill should have been defeated, as I argued at the
time. 10 Gingrich's proposal was to amend the EPA's lawmaking
power. Mine is to end it.
In the stylized struggle between "good" EPA and "bad" big business, most voters support the EPA because they distrust big business.
In a column chiding President George W. Bush for dismissing an
EPA report as written by "bureaucrats," journalist Thomas L. Friedman wrote that he wanted to be counted as having a fundamental
belief in federal agencies, "not because I have no faith in ordinary
Americans, but because I have no trust in ordinary Big Oil ... to do

the right thing without proper oversight.' I often admire Mr.
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Friedman, but not here. He is, of course, right to distrust large
corporations, but big oil sometimes gets what it wants from the EPA.
That is only one reason to distrust the EPA. Voters should not have
to take its laws on trust.
Mr. Friedman's "not ... hav[ing] no faith in ordinary Americans" is less faith than we deserve. The great majority of ordinary
Americans ( 68 percent) tell pollsters that the public does not care
enough about the environment.12 Think about it. Most people think

most people do not care enough about the environment. We do care
enough. The problem is that we have been convinced we do not.
Once we get that sorted out, there will be an end to "environmental
protection" without representation.

